Description
Resulting from several social, political, economic and above all radical Islamic factors, the armed conflict in Cabo Delgado raised a variety of questions in the national and international system, among them the modus operandi of the group, now called Ahlu Sunnah Wa-Jammá. Thus, the present article analyses the way in which the modes of insurgency and subversion help to understand the modus operandi of the Ahlu Sunnah Wa-Jammá. For this purpose, a methodological study was established in which the semi-structured interview technique involved officers and documentary analysis for data collection. The results of the study show that the modus operandi of the Ahlu Sunnah Wa-Jammá is circumscribed to the organisation of numerous semi-autonomous cells which carry out guerrilla, terrorist and subversive actions. Furthermore, it was highlighted that the conflict was initiated by a minority of individuals subordinate to a radical religious ideology, and the objective of its operationalisation, until then, was carried out in three phases: preparatory, agitation and insurrection.
